The World Is Nothing More Than A Dream - An Insight From Mandukya Upanishad

Note: the intention of the article is to demonstrate that the world is as unreal as the dream but this does not mean that the world is equal to the dream. Discretion is expected from the reader.

Bishop Berkeley, who was a philosopher believed that all material objects and space and time are an illusion. When the famous Dr Johnson was told of Berkeley's opinion, he shouted, "I refute it thus!" and stubbed his toe on a large stone.

A very brief history of the idea that the world is an illusion in the west thus ended with the cry of Dr Johnson. No one dared to question the pain in his toe. But in India in a very remote past when the geniuses such as Gaudapadacharya (Grand-master of Adi Shankaracharya) stubbed their brain on Upanishads such as Mandukya Upanishad, this idea that the world is nothing more than a dream was established.

It's our common sense that the world as we see it is real and the dream which happens to be is obviously false. So, we have some common challenges against the idea. All these challenges are assimilated in an Appendix of the second volume of the book "The Upanishads" by Swami Nikhilananda. He has listed ten challenges to this idea and clarified it in a lucid way with detailed reasoning.

Before going into it I just want to clarify a point of caution the idea of the world being an illusion does not imply that I or you are an illusion. The Upanishad that suggests the world is nothing more than a dream asserts more profoundly that you are more than a dreamer.

Objection 1: It is generally admitted that the waking experience and dream experience are different from each other: the objects perceived in dreams are unreal, and those perceived in the waking state are real.

Reasoning: Dream objects are felt, while the dream lasts to be as real as those of the waking state. In dreams, as in the waking state, there exists a sense of distinction between real and unreal. While dreaming, the sleeping person regards the dream state as the waking state. He somehow distinguishes it from other states; otherwise, he could not regard the dream experiences as real, even for the time being. Further, one sometimes sees illusory objects in a dream and knows them to be so while dreaming. Thus one somehow makes a distinction between illusion and reality in the dream itself.

Let's understand this through an illustration. You had a friend and experienced his death. This was the waking state experience. Now, you see him alive. Naturally, you will thank God and blame yourself for imagining nonsense and bad things. This appears to be your waking state and previous experience proved to be unreal. Next, again you find him dead and this experience matches with the initial experience, so, you will call this and the initial one the waking state and the state you experienced in between happens to be a dream.

To us, our present state is always the waking state and we judge between real and unreal. No one says oh presently I am dreaming.

Objection 2: It is contended that dream objects are subjective, that is to say, that they are the creation of the sleeper's mind, whereas waking objects are real, that is to say, they exist outside, independent of the perceiver, and are perceived by means of sense-organs. What makes this difference is said to be the instrumentality of the sense organs, which are active in the waking state and inactive in sleep. After waking, a man realizes that he was dreaming, because he knows then that he saw the objects in his dream though his senses were not functioning.

Reasoning: A distinction made on such grounds is not plausible. The sense organs and the physical bodies of the dream world are as active as those of the waking world. In dreams, too, one not only thinks, but touches, tastes, smells, hears and sees objects though they are only creations of the dream. A man dreams that he sees a mountain, climbs it, and feels satisfied after reaching the top. Thus there exists not only an ego but also external objects and inner feelings in the dream state as in the waking. But the sense-organs which appear to be real in one state are found to be unreal in the other.

To us, in the waking or so-called dream state, objects exist outside, independent of the perceiver, and perceived by means of sense-organs.

Objection 3: The dream experience is said to be private, its objects and actions being known to the dreamer and none else, whereas the waking experience is shared by others.

Reasoning: The application of the idea of "private" or "public" to distinguish the objects of one state from those of another is not valid. Like the waking world, the dream world, too, has not only its sun, moon, and stars, but other living beings as well, who share with the so-called dreamer the experience of the so-called dream. Dream experience has as much of a public character, so long as the dream lasts, as a waking experience.

We always share our experiences with others. One set of experiences is shared with one set of people whereas another set of experiences is shared with other sets of people.

Objection 4: Waking percepts-in contrast to dream percepts are said to endure for an appreciable and measurable period of time.

Reasoning: Dream objects are also observed to endure for months and years, though the dream may not last for more than a few minutes as measured by the standard of time of the waking mind. The sense of time is present in both states: each has its independent standard of measurement, although the standard of one state, appearing real in that state, is proved false in the other.

Objection 5: It observed that the money a dreamer possesses cannot purchase his bread and butter when he feels hungry in the waking state.

Reasoning: Likewise, the money owned by a waking person does not serve a similar purpose in his dreams. If the test of reality is pragmatic, it can be said that dream objects are means to dream ends just as much as waking objects are means to waking ends.

Objection 6: Dream percepts are often found to be queer and fantastic, the likes of which are not seen in the world of the waking man.

Reasoning: Such percepts, however absurd, appear perfectly normal to the dreamer. Obviously, he has his own notions of time, space, distance, and form. But his standards are unreal to the waking person. Similarly, the standards of the waking state do not apply in the dream, though both standards have their application in their respective spheres.

Objection 7: It may be objected that dream experiences are refuted by waking ones. A man, after waking, can judge the merits of the dream; but waking experiences are not found to be unreal in dreams, nor does a person sit in judgment, while dreaming, over his waking experiences. Therefore the two states cannot be placed on the same level.

Reasoning: In answer, it may be said that to the dreamer the dream is a waking state. In fact, whether a person is awake or dreaming, what passes before him is simply a succession of waking states, one group of real objects coming after another. The special feature of the waking state is that the objects perceived in it are felt to be real. It is the objects of one waking state that are judged in another waking state. When these objects turn out, in the other state, to be unreal, that state is called a dream. Thus it is only one waking state that is refuted by another waking state. The dream state continually suggests that the waking world, though different, has no higher value than the dream world.

Objection 8: It is said that what gives the indisputable stamp of reality to the waking state is that we return to the same objects-such as children, relatives, friends, and house-every time we awake, whereas we do not see the same objects in the successive dream states.

Reasoning: In reply, the Vedánta declares that the dream state is a waking state for the dreamer, as has already been pointed out, and one knows a state to be a waking state only when there is the feeling that the objects seen are real and, as such, remain the same in all waking states. This feeling must be present even while a person is dreaming; otherwise, he cannot regard the dream as a waking state and the objects seen in it as real. Whether we actually return to the same objects in every waking state is a matter for investigation confined to the waking state. But the fact remains that we have the feeling that real objects are unchanging and that all waking states have the characteristic of presenting real or unchanging objects.

We have to understand that by equating the waking state to the dream state, it is not intended to give the dream the status of reality but to the waking the status of illusion. If unchanging is the test of reality then we see everything changing in our so-called waking state which proves they are not real although they appear as things appear in a dream.

Objection 9: It may be contended that if the objects of the waking state are exactly like those of the dream state, then our beloved kith and kin would be no more than ideas, like those of our dream-world relatives. Such an attitude is repugnant to our feelings.

Reasoning: The reply of the Vedánta is that relatives seen in the waking or the dream state are as real as the "I," or ego, which deals with them. Their physical bodies also are as real as our bodies in those states. For instance, if a man in the waking state regards his ego or body as real, then his kith and kin are also to be regarded as real in that state. Confusion arises when a man thinks his body or ego is real and the bodies or egos of others are mere ideas.

Objection 10 (i): It may be urged that in dreams the objects one takes to be real are mere ideas, whereas in the waking state the real appears real, and the unreal is unreal (i.e. mere ideas). Further, in the waking state, a man has a more clear and more logical mind than while he is dreaming.

Reasoning: In reply, it may be said that a person fully awake sometimes sees a snake to be real, whereas after inquiry he finds it to be only a rope. Till the truth is known, the snake is real to him, though in fact, it is only an idea projected by his mind. (If a person has never before seen a snake, but has seen something else such as a stick, which resembles a rope, he would see a stick, that is to say, he would see what his memory produces.) Therefore, it is not in dreams alone that ideas appear real, in the waking state a similar phenomenon takes place.

Objection 10 (ii): One may remark, however, the illusions are exceptions and that one sees in the waking state many realities which are not illusions.

Reasoning: In reply, the Vedánta declares that nothing is more real to man than his own body. He had a body when he was six years old, and now, at sixty, he has a body too. But what he thought most real at six is no longer there at sixty, at which age the former body is only a memory or idea.

Objection 10 (iii): The example of a body, it may be objected, implies a lapse of time.

Reasoning: But it can be said in answer that one and the same object is sometimes found to appear at the same moment in different forms to different persons, and these appearances are real to the persons concerned. What one sees are only forms or ideas.

The scream of Dr Johnson which seems to be non-trivial in western philosophy now can be replied calmly that he could kick a rock in his dream as well and the pain he would suffer is as non-trivial as his pain in waking state!